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Controversial Scholarship and Faculty
Appointments: A Dean's View
Geoffrey R. Stone*
I would like to focus my remarks on a problem that has plagued
numerous law schools in recent years: How should a dean think about the
institutional issues posed by the need to evaluate "novel," "controversial,"
or "unorthodox" forms of scholarship in the context of faculty appointments and promotions? It is appropriate to examine this issue in a
conference on The Voices of Women because the most important and most
visible cases regarding this question in recent years have involved the work
of feminist scholars.
I should state two rather obvious caveats at the outset. First, not all
women scholars engage in feminist or "unorthodox" forms of scholarship.
Thus, the problem I am addressing is not directly relevant to the appointment or promotion of all or perhaps even most women faculty. Second, the
underlying problem I am addressing is not unique to feminist scholars. To
the contrary, in varying forms the problem can be, and has been, posed by
very different types of work at different institutions. It can be posed not
only by feminist scholarship, but also by critical legal studies; law and
economics; critical race theory; legal realism; public choice; empirical
research; legal history; jurisprudence; law and literature; representational
art; and fiction, such as my colleague Norval Morris's short stories, which
are designed to illustrate important points of criminal law.
The starting point is with a conception of "good" scholarship. Is there
any consensus on the attributes of "good" scholarship? I will accept for
these purposes the definition Stephen Carter sets forth in a recent piece in
Reconstruction:'
[T]he quality of a piece of scholarly work . . . turns on a

demonstrated mastery of the relevant material and the ability to
contribute to a dialogue, or to spark a new one. It turns on saying
something that not only is not in the prior literature, but is not
obvious in light of the prior literature. It turns, further, on making
a logical argument-not a correct one, necessarily, or even a
non-controversial one, but certainly one that is coherent. And it
turns on setting out fairly the possible objections and dealing with
the extent to which they
them, or even noting, when appropriate,
2
position.
own
one's
limit
successfully
*Harry Kalven, Jr. Professor of Law and Dean, The University of Chicago Law School.

1. Stephen L. Carter, The Best Black, And Other Tales, Reconstruction, Winter 1990, at
6, 29.

2. Id. at 29.
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Put differently, "good" scholarship must be "original" and it must advance
our understanding. Beyond that, it should be thorough, careful, evenhanded, coherent, and intellectually honest.
So, why can't we just read the material and decide whether these
requirements are met? There are at least three problems. First, we may
undervalue "good" work because we do not understand it. Aficionados of
law and literature may not appreciate the subtle elegance of a novel
application of the Coase Theorem. They may not understand why the work
is original or useful. Moreover, because they do not grasp the work's
substance, they may tend to dismiss its significance. Even law professors fall
victim to human nature.
Second, we may undervalue "good" work because it suggests, implicitly or explicitly, that the work we do is not valuable. Practitioners of law and
economics may feel that feminist theory rejects the basic premises of their
work. An all-too-human response is to dismiss those ideas that do not
"appropriately" value our own.
Third, we may undervalue "good" work because it promotes a view of
the legal system or society or human relations that is fundamentally
inconsistent with our own world view. Such work may challenge not only
the value of our work, but also our broader sense of the appropriate order
of things socially, economically, politically, and personally. Work that casts
doubt upon everything we cling to is not likely to be embraced enthusiastically.
While recognizing the danger that we may tend reflexively to dismiss
or to undervalue new or unorthodox scholarship, it is also important to
recognize that such scholarship is not necessarily "good" merely because it
is new or unorthodox. To the contrary, just as there are dangers of
undervaluing such work, there are dangers of overvaluing it as well.
For one thing, there is a real risk of fadism. We like new things. They
make life exciting. We must guard against the temptation to be swept away
by what is in vogue and by the appeal of new answers to old questions. We
need only think back, perhaps with some embarrassment, to some past fads
in the realm of ideas, art, literature, music, dress, and the like to see the
danger.
Moreover, the risk of overvaluing such work may be especially acute in
the realm of scholarly research. Quite frankly, it is difficult to make a useful
contribution at the cutting edge of legal scholarship. Sometimes it seems
that everything worth saying has been said. But then comes a new way of
thinking, a new way of approaching old problems. Suddenly, there is all
sorts of work to be done. Whole new avenues of inquiry are opened to us.
Opportunities abound. As if by magic, there is suddenly an easy answer to
the often paralyzing question: What do I write about next? New forms of
scholarship may provide easy, perhaps too easy, temptations.
Because we have limited resources, and, in any event, should care
about excellence, we cannot escape responsibility for making judgments
about the quality of particular scholarly works. We need a way to make
judgments wisely. How do we do that? As a dean, I have often faced this
problem, not only as an individual making my own judgments, but also as
one charged with the responsibility for helping to guide a particular law
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school towards better rather than worse institutional decisions. When faced
with an appointments issue that poses such questions, I try to promote an
environment in which the decisions will be made fairly, carefully, openmindedly, and with a healthy dose of skepticism.
First, I urge faculty members to talk with each other. I urge them to
define for one another precisely why they like or dislike the work in
question. I ask them to try to understand why their colleagues may hold
different views. Second, I urge those colleagues who view the work
negatively to reread it and ask themselves not, "What is wrong with this
work?" but, rather, "What can I learn from it?" Third, I urge those
colleagues who view the work positively to try to translate it into more
conventional or more familiar terms for those who are doubtful. Even if
something is lost in translation, this may help those who are negative to
better understand why those who are positive value the work. Moreover,
such discussion sometimes Works in the opposite direction. In attempting to
translate the work into more familiar terms, a proponent may come to
appreciate the work's weakness.
Finally, I encourage faculty at all times to respect the judgments and
trust the good faith of their colleagues. I remind them ad nauseam that, as
colleagues, they share a common mission and that they must remember
that other members of the faculty are just as sincere and just as wellintentioned as they are. I urge them whenever possible to defer to the
strongly held views of their colleagues. At the same time, I urge them not
to have strongly held views unless they are prepared to ask others to defer
and they are willing to take real responsibility for the ultimate decision.
The idea, in short, is to talk it out over a period of time in an effort to
reach a shared consensus. This works best, I think, if the discussion takes
place informally, behind closed doors or in small groups over lunch, rather
than in formal memoranda or open faculty meetings. In formal settings,
feelings are more likely to be hurt, nasty comments are more likely to be
hurled, ideological lines are more likely to be drawn, and angers are more
likely to rise.3
I should offer some final thoughts. This process is most likely to
succeed if disputes over the value of unorthodox forms of scholarship arise
from different perspectives at different times. It is important that different
members of the faculty find themselves on different sides of the "let's take
a risk" versus the "let's be cautious" issue in different cases. Deference,
mutual respect, and consensus are impossible if one group within the
faculty is always asked to defer to the other. Deference, mutual respect, and
an effort to achieve consensus will be in the self-interest of all members of
the community only if all participants understand that in the long run it is
in their individual as well as their common interest. Thejurisprude is more
3. I agree with Sylvia Law that such "informal caucusing" has its risks. See Sylvia A. Law,
Good Intentions Are Not Enough: An Agenda on Gender for Law School Deans, 77 Iowa L.
Rev. 79, 86 (1992) (observing that closed-door meetings and informal caucusing have
disadvantaged women scholars in the past). However, in my view a careful dean can guard
against those risks while at the same time making effective use of such informal meetings.

HeinOnline -- 77 Iowa L. Rev. 75 1991-1992

77

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[1991]

likely to credit the judgment of the empiricist if she knows the empiricist
will give similar respect to her judgment when the occasion arises.
There will, of course, be cases when consensus just cannot be reached.
After all the dust settles, some people may still feel quite strongly about the
issue from directly incompatible positions. What happens then? Should a
dean or a law school err on the side of acceptance or rejection of new,
unorthodox, and controversial work in such circumstances? One way to
think about this issue is to assess the relative costs of error. If you reject
work because you think it is bad and you are wrong, you deny your students
and your faculty exposure to new and different ideas. That is obviously a
significant cost. It is not necessarily an irrevocable cost from the standpoint
of the institution, however, for it may be possible to mitigate the long-term
cost by correcting the error at some point in the future. In the short run,
however, the cost of this error to students and faculty alike is potentially
quite serious. And, of course, the cost to the particular appointments
candidate involved may be enormous, especially if the issue arises in the
context of an internal promotion to tenure.
On the other hand, if you make an appointment because you think a
person's work is good and you are wrong, you may set up an especially
painful tenure decision several years down the road. If the appointment in
question involves tenure, you may stick your school with a lifetime of bad
work from one or more of your colleagues, thus undermining both the
institutional sense of mission and the commitment to excellence. The
stakes, either way, are unavoidably high.
There is, of course, no universally correct way to resolve this conflict.
The matter will depend primarily on the culture, values, and needs of the
particular institution involved. Some law schools can and should be all
things to all people, providing a rich diversity of views acros s the entire
spectrum of ideas and methodologies. Consistent with this self-definition,
such schools may tend to err on the side of risking the appointment of
controversial or unorthodox scholars. Indeed, their greatest strength may
lie in their willingness to take such risks in order to foster the broadest
possible diversity of views. There is, however, a cost to such an approach,
for in a world of limited resources, breadth of views across a faculty may
come at the price of depth of expertise in any particular field.
For this reason, other schools can and should focus on developing
certain areas of specialization. They may prefer to concentrate faculty in
particular fields, such as law and literature, feminism, jurisprudence, law
and economics, or the like. The strength of these schools lies to some
degree in their specialization, in their ability to provide students with
especially extensive exposure to particular areas of inquiry, and in their
capacity to provide an unusually supportive and intellectually collegial
environment for those who work in or around the fields of specialization.
Given this self-definition, such schools might approach new or unorthodox
forms of scholarship with a somewhat greater sense of caution.
Ultimately, however an institution resolves these issues, it should
always strive towards two ideals. First, law schools should always be open to
new ideas. Scholarship should never be dismissed as unworthy merely
because it is unorthodox, controversial, or even deeply unsettling. Second,
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at all levels of appointment, law schools should insist on excellence in
scholarly research. Such excellence can take many forms, but that does not
mean there are no standards. To the contrary, we can articulate coherent
standards of excellence, those standards can be applied to the broadest
spectrum of legal scholarship, and it is the duty of each law school to find
ways to implement those standards in a fair, rigorous, and open-minded
manner.
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